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Traditionally ﬁsheries management has focused on biomass and mortality, expressed annually and across large management units.
However, because ﬁsh abundance varies at much smaller spatio-temporal scales, ﬁshing mortality can potentially be controlled
more effectively if managed at ﬁner scale. The ecosystem approach requires more indicators at ﬁner scales as well. Incorporating eco-
system targets would need additional management tools with potentially conﬂicting results. We present a simple, integrated, man-
agement approach that provides incentives for “good behaviour”. Fishers would be given a number of ﬁshing-impact credits, called
real-time incentives (RTIs), to spend according to spatio-temporally varying tariffs per ﬁshing day. RTI quotas and tariffs could be
based on commercial stocks and ecosystem targets. Fishers could choose how to spend their RTIs, e.g. by limited ﬁshing in high-
catch or sensitive areas or by ﬁshing longer in lower-catch or less sensitive areas. The RTI system does not prescribe and forbid,
but instead allows ﬁshers to ﬁsh wherever and whenever they want; ecosystem costs are internalized and ﬁshers have to take
them into account in their business decisions. We envisage no need for traditional landings or catch quotas for the ﬂeets while op-
erating under the scheme. The approach could facilitate further devolution of responsibility to industry.
Keywords: discards, ecosystem approach to ﬁsheries management (EAFM), ﬁsheries management, incentives, internalised costs, real-time
information, spatio-temporal ﬂexibility, tariffs.
Introduction
In this study, we explore a novel approach to the management of
fisheries (i) that allows the inclusion of multiple and diverse
drivers, (ii) that is highly resolved both spatially and temporally,
(iii) that can be simply understood at the level of a single
vessel’s operational choices, and (iv) that provides incentives for
“good behaviour”. It should also move some way towards a rever-
sal of the burden of proof, an adaptive and results-based manage-
ment approach, and a more devolved and less top–down
management.
We do not propose this approach as a panacea to solve all pro-
blems in all fisheries. It is presented as a mean to accommodate the
complexities inherent in combining single and multispecies fisher-
ies management with an ecosystem approach. How applicable it
will be will depend on the ecological, economic, and social charac-
teristics of a particular fishery. Additionally, and in keeping with
the fact that the paper is in the Food for Thought section, we
are not prescriptive about the specific application of our approach
as this would also be case-dependent and would require a detailed
assessment by relevant stakeholders and policy-makers on the
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necessary value judgements and preferred trade-offs for a particu-
lar fishery. Similarly, a detailed management strategy evaluation
(MSE) type assessment of a particular fishery is beyond the
scope of this paper, but given that the approach has already
attracted the interest from members of the North Western
Waters Regional Advisory Council (NWWRAC) and from the
Scientific, Technical, and Economic Committee for Fisheries
(STECF), we intend to follow-up with such an evaluation.
We live in a changing world, but fisheries management has
largely remained static in approach, based mainly on managing
the abundance and fishing mortality of single commercial
species. This is generally by single-species landings quotas (total
allowable catches, TACs) along with effort and capacity controls
and technical measures. But these tools are inadequate for an
ecosystem approach to fisheries management (EAFM), where we
would have to include mixed-fisheries and multispecies interac-
tions and effects on the wider ecosystem. So, presumably, we
would then need additional rules and regulations to encompass
these wider EAFM drivers, which would have the effect of increas-
ing management complexity (Garcia and Cochrane, 2005;
Crowder et al., 2008). In parallel with these ongoing challenges
in moving towards EAFM, a paradigm shift is occurring from
top–down regulation (Daw and Gray, 2005) towards strengthened
stakeholder participation in fisheries governance, reflected in the
Green Paper of the European Commission (EC) on the new
Common Fisheries Policy (CFP; Anon., 2009b) and the EC’s pro-
posal for the new CFP (Anon., 2011). The EC Green Paper essen-
tially proposes devolution towards more regional-based
management and to include all stakeholders directly in developing
fisheries management plans. Current thinking is that fisheries
management plans that include fishers in the decision-making
process are more likely to be successful in achieving objectives
(Kelly et al., 2006; Kraak, 2011). Alongside these significant
changes in the traditional fisheries management process, there
are rapid and ongoing developments in technology that can be dir-
ectly utilized for fisheries assessment and management. For
example, real-time high-resolution spatio-temporal data on
vessel activity [vessel monitoring systems, VMSs (e.g. Gerritsen
and Lordan, 2011)] and catches [electronic logbooks and fully
documented fishing (Kindt-Larsen et al., 2011)] are becoming
available. These new types of data have the potential to transform
fisheries management. Rather than considering large management
areas in annual cycles and on a single-stock basis, we may be able
to use these technologies to move directly into a more spatio-
temporally dynamic fisheries management approach [e.g. using
real-time information for closures (Holmes et al., 2011; Needle
and Catarino, 2011)] that integrates objectives for multiple com-
mercial stocks with ecosystem considerations. It would enable
the directing of fishing effort at a fine spatio-temporal scale such
that species with ample agreed fishing opportunities can be tar-
geted while avoiding concentrations of species with low fishing op-
portunities and/or otherwise vulnerable areas.
In this paper, we describe our approach, which we call the “real-
time incentive (RTI)” approach, in analogy to real-time closures
(Needle and Catarino, 2011). In our approach, however, real-time
spatial information is generally not used to close areas (although
this possibility can be included), but instead incentives are pro-
vided to encourage fishing in certain areas rather than in others.
The approach is implemented through quotas of fishing-impact
credits, which we name “RTIs”, which are related to fishing oppor-
tunities of commercial stocks and ecosystem targets through
spatio-temporal tariffs. The approach does not “provide” (ratio-
nales for) the (ecosystem) objectives, targets, and fishing oppor-
tunities; these need to be decided upon through the appropriate
governance scheme, e.g. the EU. Similar approaches have been
proposed and explored, such as the individual habitat quota
system for habitat conservation (Holland and Schnier, 2006a, b)
and the individual transferable effort system implemented for
the Australian Eastern tuna and billfish fishery (Pascoe et al.,
2010) incentivising lower bycatch of vulnerable species through
spatially varying multipliers of allowed effort. Our approach
goes beyond these, because it proposes an explicit implementation
for the regulation of the actual fishing opportunities on commer-
cial (target) stocks, into which the ecosystem considerations can be
integrated through the use of a single credit currency.
To illustrate how this approach might work, we use historical
data from the Irish and Celtic Seas and give two examples of dif-
ferent management objectives that could be addressed using this
approach: (i) managing cod (Gadus morhua) mortality; (ii) man-
aging bycatch of protected elasmobranch species, while also man-
aging cod mortality. Part and parcel of the approach is the risk
estimation used for the setting as well as the results-based adjust-
ing of the tariffs. We use the Irish and Celtic Seas’ cod fisheries for
the illustration because for the Irish Sea the current management
plan for cod may actually allow Member States to unilaterally
adopt our approach for (a segment of) their fleet [under the pro-
vision of Article 13 (Anon., 2008)], and for the Celtic Sea, our ap-
proach may be timely because a management plan for cod is
currently under development with participation from the
NWWRAC.
We discuss how the approach could be extended and adjusted
to suit additional management requirements, such as mixed-
fisheries and/or ecosystem considerations. Our proposed ap-
proach represents a radical departure from current management
frameworks, and accordingly, we also discuss briefly some of the
significant governance issues which may arise from it.
The RTI approach
The basis of the approach is that the area would be divided up into
“cells” at a high spatial resolution. Each cell would have a certain
“cost” applied to fishing in that cell. These costs would be set by
managers. Fishers would then “pay” these costs in RTIs from
their individual RTI account, allocated at the start of the manage-
ment period, e.g. year. The costs, or tariffs (e.g. in RTIs per day),
associated with fishing in each of the cells would be shown on
colour-coded tariff maps. Using these maps, fishers are then free
to fish when and where they choose as long as their RTI credit
lasts; they would not be allowed to exceed their RTI quota once
they have exhausted it. The total amount of RTIs annually avail-
able can be set in relation to (internationally) agreed objectives
or targets of the fishing mortality rate (or parts thereof if
applied to fleet segments) of the stock of interest. There would
be no catch or landings quota of the stock(s) of interest for fisher-
ies while operating under the RTI scheme.
The cell tariffs could initially be set according to the historical
spatial patterns of the catchability of the stock of interest.
The tariffs can also be modified by expert biological knowledge
(e.g. location of spawning grounds, etc.) and/or based on stake-
holder input. Additional spatial information about the ecosystem
can be built into the tariffs depending on management objectives.
For example, vulnerable areas, such as cold water corals, nursery
areas, spawning grounds, marine mammal hotspots, could all be
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included. The approach also allows for the (temporary) closure of
particular cells or groups of cells. For example, this could be where
there had been a recent, particularly high catch of a species of
interest, similar to the real-time closures used for cod in the
North Sea (Holmes et al., 2011). Closures could also be applied
to protect vulnerable ecosystem components (e.g. cold water
corals) or for any other agreed rationale. Such closures can effect-
ively be seen as applying an “infinite” tariff. As in all aspects of the
approach, such decisions should be transparent and involve all sta-
keholders, not just fishers.
Tariffs could be updated on any chosen time-scale. This tem-
poral update could have different time-scales for different
factors—e.g. “real-time” (say, weekly) update for the stock of
interest by landings per unit effort (lpue) values, but possibly
annual updates for habitat importance, or update when new infor-
mation becomes available, etc. For time-invariant factors, there
would be no update needed at all. The updating rules should
also be transparent and open to participatory decision-making, in-
volving expert opinion and stakeholders in a clear and unbiased
process.
An essential part of the approach is that through simulations
the tariffs can be related to the levels of risk of under- and over-
shooting the various targets or objectives; these risk levels can be
set explicitly by managers in a transparent way (reflecting societal
choices). The approach is adaptive: if it fails to deliver one or the
other aim or objective on a particular time-scale, the tariffs can be
adjusted up or down, for example, at annual time-scales.
Illustration of the RTI approach: Irish Sea and
Celtic Sea
Managing the cod ﬁshery
Using data from 2006–2009, we created “heat maps” where the
grid cells are coloured according to their lpue relative to the
mean lpue of all grid cells with ≥20 h effort. The mean lpue was
estimated, as described below, separately for each of the two
stocks, the Irish Sea cod and the Celtic Sea cod (Figure 1a; for con-
venience, both are plotted on the same map). The relative lpue was
divided into six arbitrary classes of: 0–0.1, 0.1–0.5, 0.5–1, 1–2,
2–5, and .5 times the mean lpue.
Following the method described by Gerritsen and Lordan
(2011), each VMS record of Irish demersal otter trawlers (OTB)
was allocated an effort value, which is the time since the previous
VMS record (generally 2 h). The VMS data were filtered for vessel
speeds between 1.5 and 4.5 knots to select records corresponding
to fishing activity. Gerritsen and Lordan (2011) have shown that
vessel speed can distinguish fishing activity of demersal otter traw-
lers with an accuracy of 88%. Skippers of EC vessels of ≥10 m in
overall length are also required to record their retained catches
daily (EEC, 1983). The daily retained catches (from here
onwards referred to as “landings”) of cod were allocated equally
to the “fishing” VMS records for each vessel and date. The result-
ing cod landings and effort data were aggregated to a grid of 0.38
longitude × 0.28 latitude. Any grid cells with ,20 h effort were
omitted from the calculations involving the 2006–2009 data, but
all information was retained for the weekly 2010 data (see below).
Because in this study we only want to illustrate the approach
rather than calculate values to be used in actual management, we
pooled the data over the mesh size groups. If this approach were
taken up as a cod avoidance plan under the Article 13 provision
of the Irish Sea cod management plan (Anon., 2008), calculations
should be done separately for the mesh sizes of ≥100 mm (TR1)
and 70–99 mm (TR2) of the OTB, and calculations could be
done for the other regulated gear groups as well. Likewise, for the
Celtic Sea separate calculations could be done by gear group and/
or me´tier (a me´tier is defined as: “a group of fishing operations tar-
geting a similar (assemblage of) species, using similar gear, during
the same period of the year and/or within the same area and which
are characterized by a similar exploitation pattern”; ICES, 2003).
These me´tiers or gear or mesh size groups would then each have
their own set of heat maps. In the current case of pooled OTB
data, we pooled the data over the years 2006–2009.
From these relative lpue maps, baseline RTI-tariff maps were
created, by translating the relative lpue classes into tariffs of 0.1,
0.5, 1, 2, and 5 RTIs for the first five lpue classes and designating
the grid cells with .5 times the mean lpue as closed areas; in add-
ition, all grid cells for which no cod lpue information exists got a
tariff of 0.1 RTI (Figure 1b). In this example, the tariffs are set
“precautionary” in that each tariff is the upper value of the
range of the respective relative lpue, and the highest is set as
closed to fishing. Risk analyses can be done (see below) so that
managers can decide how to set the tariff levels relative to the
risk of over- or undershooting of the intended catch levels or
fishing mortality rates they deem acceptable.
Figure 1. (a) 2006–2009 cod lpue relative to the mean, separately for the Irish Sea and the Celtic Sea; (b) RTI tariffs; (c) RTI tariffs for selective
gear.
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RTI credits or RTIs can be seen as fishing day equivalents in
terms of mean fishing pressure. The total available amount of
RTIs in a year follows from the Member State’s allocated
fishing opportunity for cod. For an agreed TAC and the
Member State’s portion of it, a scientific advisory forecast
could predict, based on historical data, how many average
fishing days would be needed to take that catch; this could be
done separately for the respective gear or mesh-size groups or
me´tiers. For a management plan with an effort regime, the avail-
able RTIs might be directly related to the maximum allowable
effort. In any case, each vessel gets assigned a number of RTIs
equivalent to the number of average fishing days allowed.
Throughout the year, fishers can then fish wherever they want,
except in the closed areas, and they will have to pay 0.1, 0.5,
1, 2, or 5 RTIs per day, respectively, from their account until
their RTI allocation is exhausted. Therefore, a fisher can fish
in the white areas (which are areas for which either no cod
catch information is available or the historical lpue is only up
to 0.1 of the mean) and pay only 0.1 RTI per day. Expected
cod landings will be low but the fisher can target other
species and will not effectively be limited by effort restriction
while fishing there. Alternatively, a fisher can fish in the red
areas, where expected cod landings will be high, and because
he will have to pay 5 RTIs there, his effort there will be
heavily restricted by his available RTIs. In principle, controlling
fishing activity by RTIs should be sufficient: no catch/landings
quota should be necessary for the fleets/vessels while operating
under the scheme.
Incentives for the use of selective gear
The approach allows for incentives for fishers to take up more se-
lective gear by issuing different tariff maps for vessels using gear of
which a scientific study has shown that it catches cod at much
lower rates. For example, for a gear to which the cod vulnerability
has been shown scientifically to be only 10% of that for the stand-
ard gear, the baseline tariff map (Figure 1c) would allow fishing in
almost all grid cells at tariffs of only 0.1 or 0.5 RTI, which would
effectively remove effort restriction. Ideally in this type of case, the
burden of proof would be on the fisher to show that he was using
the more selective gear. The default for tariff setting would be the
least selective gear.
Real-time tariffs
The basic approach described so far will only deliver in terms of
controlling the fishing mortality to the levels intended by the
TACs or other management measure if the historical spatial pat-
terns of lpue are sufficiently predictive for the current year. The
distribution of demersal species can vary with depth, bottom
type, hydrological conditions, interactions with predators, prey
and competitors, historical contingencies (Petitgas et al., 2010),
and other variables (Planque et al., 2011). Some of these
factors are relatively constant over time, but others are not; and
certainly in a migrating species spatial patterns cannot be
expected to be constant over time. Therefore, in analogy to real-
time closures as applied in Scotland (Needle and Catarino, 2011),
in our approach, we need to update the tariffs with real-time in-
formation. Here, we did this arbitrarily as follows. Imagine that
the RTI system is in place for 2010 and that in the first week
of fishing, the tariffs are given by the baseline based on pooled
data from 2006 to 2009 (Figure 1b). The new information
coming in from the first week of fishing in 2010 gives rise to a
new lpue map (Figure 2a). We developed an algorithm which
looks up whether a given grid cell has information from the
most recent fishing week. If so, if the relative lpue falls into the
same class as on the old map, nothing happens. Conversely, if
the relative lpue of the week belongs to a higher class, the new
tariff will go up one class, and if the relative lpue of the week
belongs to a lower class, the new tariff will go down one class.
Letting tariffs go up or down by only one level at a time avoids
the issue that tariffs will be influenced too much by noise.
Other algorithms can be envisaged, for example, where a tariff
goes up or down only if the relative lpue belonged to a higher
or lower class for two consecutive weeks. In our imaginary
example, in the second week of 2010, fishing is regulated accord-
ing to the tariff map updated by information from week 1
(Figure 2b). Then, the information coming in from the second
week (Figure 2c) is used by the same algorithm to update the
map for the third week of fishing (Figure 2d). Next, the informa-
tion coming in from the third week (Figure 2e) is used by the
same algorithm to update the map for the fourth week of
fishing (Figure 2f), etc. In this illustration, the information we
use is of course derived from a fishing season in the past
(2010); however, in reality, no fishing would take place in black
cells so these could not be updated by new information. A solu-
tion would be to reset the tariff of black cells to red after 3 weeks,
analogous to the real-time closures in Scotland being closed for
only 3 weeks (Needle and Catarino, 2011). Based on the available
data for the first 18 weeks of 2010, the updated tariffs are
depicted in Figure 3. Of course, this real-time approach will
only deliver its intended results if the spatial patterns of week x
are sufficiently predictive of those of week x + 1.
Ecosystem considerations (elasmobranch conservation)
As an example of how the cod tariffs can be modified to incorpor-
ate other ecosystem elements, we used the Irish data of observed
OTB trips spanning 1995–2011 (pooled). We considered the dis-
cards per unit effort (dpue) by grid cell of a number of species of
vulnerable elasmobranchs: common skate (Dipturus batis), long-
nose skate (D. oxyrinchus), white skate (Rostroraja alba), angel
shark (Squalina squalina), spurdog (S. acanthias), porbeagle
(Lamna nasus), and basking shark (Cetorhinus maximus;
Figure 4a). Subsequently, as an intermediate step, we created a
rule whereby we arbitrarily chose “black” (closure) for all grid
cells with .10 kg h21, “red” (tariff of 5 RTIs) for all grid cells
with 1–10 kg h21, and no colour for grid cells with ,1 kg h21
(Figure 4b). Managers would make these choices based on their
conservation objectives and priorities. Finally, we then superim-
posed that map on top of the tariff map for cod such that a
darker colour in the elasmobranch map overrides a lighter
colour in the original tariff map (Figure 4c). Again, managers
may want to choose a different rule for combining the two
sources of information (e.g. a weighted sum or a weighted
average). In our example, the superimposition gives rise to add-
itional closed and high-tariff grid cells because of high elasmo-
branch discard rates; we implicitly allow fishing in areas with
low elasmobranch discard rates because those cells had received
no colour in the intermediate-step elasmobranch map
(Figure 4b) and therefore the original tariffs were not modified.
Superimposing the elasmobranch map on top of the tariff map
for selective gear, assuming that the properties that allow cod to
escape do not affect the probabilities of elasmobranch capture,
leads to a selective-gear tariff map with extensive white and
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yellow areas (with tariffs of 0.1 and 0.5 RTI, respectively) flanked
by some red areas with tariffs of 5 RTIs and some black closed grid
cells (Figure 4d). It is very important to understand that the
authors have chosen these calculation steps for illustration only.
We are not proposing that elasmobranch discards are more or
less important than cod catches. These choices should be made
by stakeholders and managers and should reflect policy objectives
which ultimately reflect societal choices.
Figure 2. (a, c, and e) Cod lpue relative to the area-speciﬁc mean in weeks 1, 2, and 3, respectively; (b, d, and f) RTI tariffs for weeks 2, 3, and 4,
respectively, updated by real-time information of weeks 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
594 S. B. M. Kraak et al.
 at A
lbert Slom
an Library, U
niversity of Essex on N
ovem
ber 13, 2012
http://icesjms.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Illustration of risk calculation for setting and adjusting
tariffs in relation to target species
Now, we illustrate the principles of how the risk of over- and
under-catching the intended levels can be explored. Note that
this simulation is not meant as a validation of the approach or
of the choice of tariffs. Managers could use more sophisticated ver-
sions of these methods, when first setting the tariffs according to
their objectives but also to adjust them adaptively if they find
that results did not achieve the objectives. We used the weekly
tariffs, as updated by the previous week’s information, for the
first 35 weeks of 2010 (as in Figure 3; except that for the purposes
of this illustration, we treated the Celtic and Irish Seas as one). We
simulated fishing in these 35 weeks, restricting activity to the area
fished in 2006–2009. In this simulation, it is assumed (for simpli-
city) that fishing trips are restricted to only one grid cell each in a
given week. In reality, these calculations can be done in a more
sophisticated way to capture more uncertainty. We assigned trips
randomly to the three-dimensional matrix formed by the available
grid cells (those with data for 2006–2009; latitude and longitude
representing two dimensions) and the 35 weeks (the third dimen-
sion), until 1000 RTIs were spent (this can be thought of as equiva-
lent to 20-week-long average trips each by 50 boats) according to
the weekly tariffs. The “actual” landings were accumulated accord-
ing to the actual relative lpue data for the respective weeks and
Figure 3. RTI tariffs for weeks 5–19, updated by real-time information from the week before, weeks 4–18, respectively.
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cells, and the “intended” landings were set to 1000. This procedure
was repeated 1000 times. Figure 5 displays the frequency distribu-
tion of the actual landings relative to the intended landings (a
value of 1 indicates that the actual landings were equal to the
intended landings). It is clear that, in this case, the weekly
spatial patterns predict the patterns of the following week quite
well. In combination with setting the “precautionary” tariffs
(each tariff is given by the higher end of the range of relative
lpue except for the highest tariff, which represents closure), the
risk of overcatching the intended landings level is 25%, with a
risk of undershooting the intended landings of around 75%.
Nevertheless, in our example, landings are likely to be above
90% of the intended level and the risk of overshooting the
intended level by more than 10% is very low (only 3%). These
probabilities are conditional upon the (unrealistic) assumptions
within our illustration and should not be interpreted as true
risks of the described approach (Kraak et al., 2010). Managers
could use similar simulations to find the tariff setting that suits
their objectives best, even in cases with less similarity in the
spatial pattern between consecutive weeks (in which case the
spread of the histogram would be wider). Before actual implemen-
tation, an initial impact assessment is recommended, with full
MSE simulations with different plausible scenarios, for example,
of fisher behaviour. Again, it should be noted that choices of
risk levels should be made by managers and should reflect policy
objectives which ultimately reflect choices of society.
The approach can be envisaged as adaptive: if it turns out that
the intended annual catch has been overshot by an extent that is of
concern, for example, because the catchabilities were higher than
predicted (e.g. resulting from increased efficiency), the tariff-level
can be shifted upwards accordingly for the next year. Within-year
shifts of the mean tariff level would not be advisable (except for
emergencies) as this will result in unfair disadvantages (or advan-
tages) for fishers who have based their business plan on delaying
activity to later in the year.
A similar approach could be incorporated into examining the
rate of elasmobranch catch and discarding. If the levels were
deemed to have changed and, in particular, increased from what
was previously known, the tariffs could be increased to reflect
elasmobranch vulnerability.
Figure 4. (a and b) dpue of vulnerable elasmobranchs (1995–2011), visually displayed as two different classiﬁcations of levels, with (b)
reﬂecting the (ﬁctitious) management choice; (c) RTI tariffs modiﬁed by elasmobranch discard information; (d) RTI tariffs for cod-selective
gear modiﬁed by elasmobranch discard information.
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Figure 6 displays a flow chart giving an overview of the oper-
ation of the RTI approach.
Discussion
Fisheries management currently operates in a domain of unrealis-
tic precision (Hauge, 2011) based on the micro-management of
some aspects (the exploitation level of commercial target stocks
based on landings quotas), while effectively ignoring others (unin-
tended mortality of vulnerable species, collateral damage to
vulnerable habitats, discarding, and incompatibility of exploit-
ation patterns in mixed-species fisheries). We consider this para-
digm to be incompatible with effective ecosystem-based fisheries
management. In this study, we have described a new approach
to fisheries management that operates using readily available
data and that works via a single indicator of fishing activity, the
RTI fishing-impact unit. We propose that it should be possible
to manage the pressure and impact of fishing on commercial
stocks and on the ecosystem, by managing the cost and allocation
of RTIs. We do not propose a panacea that can be applied across all
fisheries in the world; we believe that the approach is appropriate
to fisheries where sufficiently temporally and spatially resolved
catch data are available.
Real-time data for the setting of tariffs and the
keeping track of RTI uptake
The approach illustrated here hinges upon the availability of real-
time spatial information on effort and landings or, ideally, catches.
Although VMS data can be used as a proxy for spatial effort (e.g.
for trawlers), these data are not without problems. For example, it
cannot be unambiguously determined whether a vessel is fishing
or not (Gerritsen and Lordan, 2011). Logbook information has
its problems as well: it is not always reliable and currently not
available on a real-time basis, but the biggest problem is that it
generally refers only to retained catches or landings [however,
since July 2011, some but not all discards have to be reported
(Anon., 2009a) and the requirement to report or even ban discards
will likely increase in the future (Anon., 2011)]. The development
of electronic logbooks (e-logbooks) may solve some of these pro-
blems but it does not address the discard issue. There may be some
promise in the development of fully documented fisheries by
on-board cameras (Townsend et al., 2008; Kindt-Larsen et al.,
2011).
On the positive side, for our approach, the VMS and e-logbook
data would be available quickly and in digital form allowing a
rapid update of the tariff maps. Enforcement and control of
single RTIs are logistically simpler than enforcement and control
of multiple catches or landings quotas. Each fisher’s uptake of
RTIs through time would be visible through electronic reporting
of spatial effort. This visibility would be to both the control
agency and to the fisher who needs to keep track of his RTI
account. Exceeding the RTI quota would be forbidden, and the
control agency can confront fishers whose RTI quota is used up.
We recognize that changing the enforcement from “evidence of
landings” to “observation of fishing” could require some change
in the laws used to enforce the control measures, this would
require scrutiny from a legal perspective, and the implication (if
any) may vary between countries.
Monitoring, tariffs, incentives, and reversal of the
burden of proof
If the tariffs are based on intended catch levels (including discards
or under a discard ban) rather than on intended landings levels,
the costs of monitoring the catches will be high. Perhaps a
system can be envisaged [based on an idea by John Simmonds
(see p. 35 in STECF, 2011)] where individual fleets or vessels can
opt for high tariffs with low monitoring or lower tariffs with com-
plete monitoring (fully documented or 100% observer coverage).
For example, the respective tariffs of white, yellow, light-orange,
dark-orange, and red would be 0.1, 0.5, 1, 2, and 5 RTIs (as in
the worked example) for the vessels that opt for complete but
Figure 5. Frequency distribution of the (simulated) actual catch
relative to the (simulated) intended catch.
Figure 6. Flow chart giving an overview of the operation of the RTI
approach. The stippled box represents the management measure
issued to ﬁshers, namely the tariff map.
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costly monitoring, and the respective tariffs would be 0.3, 1.5, 3, 6,
and 15 RTIs for vessels that opt for low-cost monitoring. These
vessels would have three times fewer fishing opportunities but
would not have as stringent and costly requirements to demon-
strate their catches and/or show that they are not discarding (in
the case of a discard ban). Essentially, this would be a reversal of
the burden of proof. Without any additional evidence, it would
be assumed that they were fishing as before, but if the fishers
could prove they were fishing more responsibly, they would then
have access to a lower tariff and thus effectively have increased
allowed fishing effort available. Although it may seem difficult to
set the tariffs relative to each other initially (e.g. based on the rela-
tive uncertainties), they can be adaptively adjusted based on past
results, e.g. annually. Responsible fishing could also be incentivised
and incorporated into “green” labelling schemes, such as that run
by the Marine Stewardship Council.
Multiple drivers
For a single species, the RTI tariffs refer to real-time, high-
resolution, relative cpue/lpue or catchability (“Fpue”) of that
species and RTI quotas are equivalent to allowed average fishing-
days in terms of allowed fishing pressure for that species; if based
on lpue data, the tariffs might be modified by spatial discard infor-
mation from observer trips. For mixed fisheries and ecosystem
considerations, the tariffs could integrate information on several
commercial species, and, for example, cetacean and seabird
bycatch, habitat impacts, high discard rates, as was illustrated
with the example of elasmobranchs.
Ecosystem impacts
In principle, the tariff maps can be modified and dynamically
updated with any kind of information policy-makers deem neces-
sary. Fishery-dependent as well as fishery-independent informa-
tion and static, time-invariant, information as well as updatable
information can be included, and the information can be weighted
according to any objectives or aims set by policy. For example,
certain information can be set to “overrule” other information,
as for the black and red areas in our elasmobranch example.
Alternatively, weights could be applied, such that cells can be
adjusted to a slightly redder or yellower colouring depending on
the information and the chosen weighting. It can be pointed out
that the boundaries of cells where, for example, elasmobranchs
were discarded are too discrete. However, depending on the
choice of the acceptable risk level for the objective under consid-
eration, neighbouring cells can get the same or similar tariffs
and/or tariffs can be updated by annual or real-time information
in an adaptive manner. It is important that multiple spatial and
temporal scales are included for a wide range of non-target
species and habitat types. For example, some seabird and pelagic
dolphin species range widely, whereas others occur in genetically
distinct populations, often on a regional seas basis (Mirimin
et al., 2009, 2011). While identifying distributional “hotspots”
on a seasonal basis is feasible, total anthropogenic removals
would need to be assessed on a wider scale, along with the discrete
units described here. The scales used for both the target species
and non-target species must be explicit to ensure that management
units overlie relevant ecological processes (Crowder et al., 2008).
Fitzpatrick et al. (2011) suggested a management approach
which would combine VMS data with benthic impact models as
a co-manageable solution to reversing the burden of proof in rela-
tion to fisheries benthic impacts. The approach proposed here is
more inclusive in that in addition to addressing benthic impacts,
it also deals with the other main environmental impacts of
fishing, removal of commercial species, and bycatch (Pascoe
et al., 2009; OSPAR, 2010).
Mixed ﬁsheries
In a mixed-fisheries approach that was explored by Rijnsdorp et al.
(2007) at a temporal (seasonal) resolution of 12 months and a
spatial resolution of four North Sea subareas, it was envisaged
that the fishers would have multiple quotas of “fishing credits”,
one quota each for every regulated species in the assemblage
caught in the mixed fishery. The fishers would then be allowed
to fish wherever and whenever they want so long as they would
not exceed any of their credit quotas (while obliged to land all
fish of these species). Therefore, a fisher could, on a certain
fishing trip, spend, for example, 7 whiting (Merlangius merlangus)
credits and only 0.5 cod credit, whereas if he were to make a dif-
ferent choice, i.e. to fish in a different subarea, he might spend
only 3 whiting credits but 5 cod credits. The fisher would have
to manage his multiple credit quotas simultaneously by making
his business decisions according to his own preferences. This
system would reconcile the different fishing opportunities arising
from different states of the stocks in the mixed assemblage—the
age-old mixed-fisheries problem (Vinther et al., 2004; Ulrich
et al., 2011)—by exploiting the knowledge of the spatio-temporal
variation in the catchabilities of the species involved.
In the past decade, several attempts have been made to tackle
the mixed-fishery dilemma, for example, by models such as
MTAC (Vinther et al., 2004), Fcube (Ulrich et al., 2011), and
others (Ra¨tz et al., 2007). Each of these proposed tools aims at a
rational compromise between the underexploitation of some
stocks and the overexploitation of others. The compromise is cal-
culated based on rules that reflect management choices, which are
either set ad hoc (STECF, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005; Vinther et al.,
2004; ICES, 2006; Ulrich et al., 2011) or according to biological
(ICES, 2006; Ra¨tz et al., 2007; Ulrich et al., 2011) or economic
(ICES, 2006; Hoff et al., 2010; Ulrich et al., 2011) objectives.
Such compromise approaches ignore the potential of adjusting
the fishing activities based on the predictable spatio-temporal vari-
ation in the catchabilities of the species involved (as in Rijnsdorp
et al., 2007), in a way that does not require a compromise between
undesirable outcomes. Note that fishers are able to fine-tune their
targeting behaviour and avoid over- and underutilization of
quotas if the incentives to do so are there (Branch and Hilborn,
2008). In current management, where overquota discarding is
legal, no such incentive exists because costs of discarding are not
internal to the fishing business. In principle, all quotas can be
taken exactly, but only if the fishers are incentivised to adjust
their spatio-temporal fishing patterns to the spatio-temporal
abundance patterns of the various fish species.
No single generic recommendation can be made at present for
how to manage the mixed fisheries: by multiple species-specific
RTI quotas (analogous to Rijnsdorp et al., 2007) or by combining
fishing opportunities for several species into one RTI system; this
choice should be made by the policy-makers in consultation with
stakeholders. Multiple RTI quotas would ensure that each species
or impact is more tightly controlled without having to find some
weighting scheme to create a single RTI that will balance impacts
on different species and ecosystem components and still allow
some fishing to take place. On the other hand, the system with
multiple RTI quotas would become overly complicated for the
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fishers to deal with, whereas the advantage of the system with only
one currency is its simplicity. In the latter case, control of each
impact would be less precise, and a compromise between conflict-
ing concerns would have to be accepted; managers would have to
decide on the appropriate weighting about the risk of under- and
overutilization of the respective fishing opportunities. Again, these
decisions should be made by the policy-makers in consultation
with stakeholders. An advantage of the use of a single currency
may actually be that it imposes the demand to explicitly trade-off
or prioritize different impacts. The problem when conflicting or
non-prioritized impacts are not explicitly handled by the (man-
agement) system is that it may result in a highly complex imple-
mentation, which is not transparent in its objectives. In either
case (multiple or single RTI quota), contradicting incentives are
avoided: in the first case, the fishers are incentivised to target op-
timally, and in the second case, there is only one quota to adhere
to, while individual flexibility is maintained. Alternatively, man-
agers could consider the most restrictive objective(s) (the species
for which the least fishing effort is allowed), e.g. cod, and set the
(multiple) RTI quota accordingly, while managing the other
species by the traditional quotas. Management area-specific solu-
tions must be worked out, preferentially in a participatory govern-
ance manner.
Transparency, ﬁsher buy-in, stakeholder participation,
and governance
The RTI system can be made completely transparent to the fishers
and other stakeholders. The fishers and other stakeholders would
have access not only to the weekly tariff maps, but also to the layers
of considerations they are composed from. In our example, they
would be able to see the map as based on the relative cod lpue,
and in addition, they would see the map as based on elasmobranch
discards, as well as the rule of combining them (in this case, super-
position with darker colours overriding lighter ones). This infor-
mation can help the fisher decide on his tactics and make a
fishing plan. This element of the approach also addresses the dif-
ficulty in linking individual vessel/skipper behaviour with wider
ecosystem level impacts (Fitzpatrick et al., 2011).
In the RTI system, the costs of fishing are internalized and have
to be “paid” (in terms of credits, equivalent to allowable fishing
opportunities) by the fishers, thereby creating the right incentives.
Whereas in the current system the costs of discarding, habitat de-
struction, or other ecosystem costs, are carried by society as a
whole (including fishers and consumers in the future), in our pro-
posed system these costs are automatically internalized to the
fishing business: fishers have to take them into account in their
business decisions. This way, fishers can be flexible in their
options but directly responsible for the damage associated with
certain activities.
The approach also addresses the current shift towards more
decentralized, flexible, and consensual styles of governance
rather than top–down, centralized, command-and-control regula-
tion. Participation is thought to increase the sense of “ownership”
among fishers towards the overfishing problem and thereby the
level of compliance to the regulations (Kraak, 2011). Giving flex-
ible choices and responsibility to fishers may also help. Rather
than the broad-brush, top–down prescriptions, and restrictions
of “one-size-for-all” nature, the freedom and flexibility in the pro-
posed system for individual fishers to choose and plan when,
where, and how to fish, within the (internationally) agreed and
biologically based constraints, makes it fit in very well with the
EU aspirations (Anon., 2009b). It corresponds well to the prefer-
ence for “a fishery-by-fishery, incentive-driven, results-based ap-
proach as part of a more participative system of management”
expressed by the industry via the North Sea Regional Advisory
Council (NSRAC) in the recent evaluation of the EU cod plans
(NSRAC opinion paper, p. 109 in STECF, 2011).
Fishers and other stakeholders could also be involved in the de-
termination of the algorithm for combining layers to generate the
tariff maps. For instance, in our example, they could propose that
the two layers be averaged, rather than superimposed. If the targets
for both cod and elasmobranchs were subsequently achieved this
combination algorithm could be retained. If not, then a more
stringent combination could be tried. In this way, the RTI ap-
proach also goes a long way to providing adaptive management
where each year’s outcome is used to modify the RTI algorithm
for the following year. The approach, therefore, is inherently
suited to co-management and could represent a pragmatic appli-
cation of managers, scientists, and stakeholders sharing the burden
of proof in contrast to the probably unrealistic expectation that in-
dustry is in a position to unilaterally shoulder that responsibility.
Our initial presentation to the fishing industry (Irish Fishery
Science Partnership, Dublin, 8 July 2011) has been received with
interest. Industry representatives particularly liked that the ap-
proach allowed them flexibility in fishing tactics (within the con-
straints of the system). The other attractive aspect was that the
system was simple in operation at the vessel level, in that they
had only one measure (the single RTIs) to consider, rather than
what they see as the current mass of often conflicting measures
(see also opinion papers of the RACs in STECF, 2011). The poten-
tial for stakeholder input was also appreciated. More generally,
they were also pleased that someone was thinking about alterna-
tives to the current management approach, which they regard as
largely discredited.
In relation to strategic behaviour by fishers in tariff-setting and
trade-off negotiation, the approach faces the same problems as any
other but has the advantage of explicit discussion between all rele-
vant participants from the outset of the required targets, desired
objectives, and underlying criteria used in deciding on weightings
and specific application of the RTI system. While not claiming that
the system is impervious to strategic actions by stakeholders, it
does contrast greatly with the current approach in many
European fisheries which suffer from inter alia a lack of clarity
in objectives and incentives for responsible stakeholder actions
(Anon., 2009b). Another positive factor is that non-permanent
spatial approaches to fisheries management, such as the Celtic
Sea cod and herring spawning box closures, continue to be well
supported by the fishing industry.
The RTI approach creates some obvious implications for fish-
eries governance. Many of these stem from our view that the ap-
proach can be implemented as a stand-alone management
framework, at least for those fleet segments operating under the
scheme, rather than an additional layer on top of the existing
input and output controls. Whether it is politically feasible to
have the RTI approach applied by only one Member State’s fleet
in a multinational fishery such as the Celtic Sea whitefish fishery
while other fleets operate under traditional quota-based manage-
ment is highly debatable and this may imply a required
pan-European adoption of the approach. Of course solutions
can be envisaged; for example, where a Member State allows
fleet segments to operate under the RTI scheme for part of the
year but still maintains the overall national quota as the annual
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limit. As mentioned before, Member States might be able to adopt
the approach for groups of vessels under Article 13 of the cod plan
for the Irish Sea, North Sea, Kattegat, or West of Scotland stocks
(Anon., 2008). Alternatively, should the RACs like the approach,
a proposal could be made for suitable trial fisheries to test the
approach.
The impact of the approach on relative stability and related to
that the tradability of credits between fishers and across fleets are
also outstanding and topical issues. We leave it open whether RTIs
should be tradable or not; both options are possible. The discus-
sions on the pros and cons of tradability of ITQs apply similar
to RTIs. All these considerations would require thorough investi-
gation with industry and policy-makers which are beyond the
scope of this study. For now, our intention is to present for discus-
sion an approach to fisheries management which addresses many
of the current challenges in implementing an EAFM.
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